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Non-Technical Summary
There exists a broad literature on fiscal competition which, so far, has mainly
focussed on the aspect of tax competition. The standard argument states
that competing governments lower their tax rates in order to attract a mo-
bile tax base, thereby neglecting negative externalities which arise for other
jurisdictions. The bottom line is an inefficiently low level of taxation and a
relative underprovision of public goods. Recent theoretical literature suggests
that fiscal externalities resulting from tax competition tend to be internalised
by redistributive grant systems, thereby raising efficiency of local public fi-
nances. Empirical research supports the view that revenue sharing exerts a
strong impact on jurisdictions’ tax policy.
An aspect which has attracted far lesser attention in the literature on
fiscal competition is that local governments may also compete for mobile
tax bases via the provision of productivity-enhancing public goods. Theo-
retical research suggests that fiscal competition in the presence of a public
input to production leads to a bias in the local spending mix, i.e. a relative
overprovision of this public input and a relative underprovision of a purely
consumptive public good. Here, we use a simple model of fiscal competition
and introduce a system of redistributive grants. As we assume tax policy to
be coordinated at the federal level, local jurisdictions can only attract the
mobile tax base by providing a productivity-enhancing public input. Using
this framework of ”expenditure competition” we analyse how fiscal equalisa-
tion transfers affect the local spending mix. We find that a higher degree of
redistribution induces the local governments to rebalance their expenditure
towards a higher share of purely consumptive spending. As the provision of
federal expenditure matching grants constitutes a way of correcting positive
fiscal externalities due to public input provision we also expand our frame-
work in order to analyse the effects of federal co-financing on the pattern of
local public spending.
The implications from the theoretical analysis are finally tested in the
course of an empirical analysis of German state expenditure policies. Ger-
many is a very interesting case to study in this context as tax rates for the
most important tax sources are set coordinately at the federal level and, on
the other hand, states can rather freely decide on the composition of the
expenditure side of their budgets. Also, Germany is characterised by a com-
plex system of intergovernmental grants. The results from our panel analysis
indicate that fiscal equalisation transfers exert an incentive effect on state
expenditure policies as suggested in our theoretical analysis. We find that a
revenue-neutral increase in the marginal contribution rate to the fiscal equal-
isation system induces local jurisdictions to increase the overall budgetary
share of consumptive public goods.
Intergovernmental Grants and Public Input
Provision: Theory and Evidence from
Germany
Sebastian Hauptmeier† (ZEW)
January 2007
Abstract: This paper uses a simple model of fiscal competition between
local jurisdictions to analyse the impact of intergovernmental grants on the
composition of public spending. We find that a higher degree of redistribution
within a system of ”fiscal equalisation” coincides with a smaller overall share
of spending on productivity-enhancing public inputs. Furthermore, in order
to test the theoretical predictions, we carry out an empirical analysis based
on a panel of German states. The results are consistent with the theoretical
findings and support the existence of an incentive effect of intergovernmental
grants on state expenditure policies.
Key Words: Fiscal competition; Fiscal equalisation; Intergovernmental
grants; Public expenditure; Germany
JEL Classification: H72, H77
I would like to thank Thiess Buettner, Robert Schwager, Johannes Rincke
and Friedrich Heinemann for very helpful comments. Support by the German
Research Foundation (DFG) within its Priority Programme 1142 ”Institu-
tionelle Gestaltung fo¨deraler Systeme” is gratefully acknowledged.
†Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), L7,1, D-68161 Mannheim, phone: +49 621 1235 143,
email: hauptmeier@zew.de.
1 Introduction
The literature on fiscal competition has so far mainly focussed on the aspect
of tax competition. The standard argument states that competing govern-
ments lower their tax rates in order to attract a mobile tax base, thereby
neglecting negative externalities which arise for other jurisdictions. The bot-
tom line is an inefficiently low level of taxation and relative underprovision of
public goods (e.g., Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). Recent literature (e.g.,
Koethenbuerger, 2002; Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006) suggests that fiscal ex-
ternalities resulting from tax competition tend to be internalised by redis-
tributive grant systems, thereby raising efficiency of local public finances.
Previous empirical research by Buettner (2006) supports the view that rev-
enue sharing exerts a strong impact on jurisdictions’ tax policy. An aspect
which has attracted far lesser attention in the literature on fiscal competition
is that local governments may also compete for mobile tax bases via the pro-
vision of productivity-enhancing public goods. Fuest (1995) argues that the
interaction of tax and expenditure policies needs to be taken into account
when analysing interjurisdictional competition in the presence of a publicly
provided input to production. Moreover, Keen and Marchand (1997) use a
standard framework of fiscal competition and show that without coordina-
tion there arises the tendency for a systematic bias in the composition of local
public spending, i.e. a relative overprovision of public inputs and a relative
underprovision of purely consumptive public goods.
Given this background we use a simple model of fiscal competition and,
similar to Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), introduce a system of redistributive
grants. As we assume tax policy to be coordinated at the federal level, local
jurisdictions can only attract the mobile tax base by providing a productivity-
enhancing public input. Using this framework of expenditure competition we
analyse how fiscal equalisation transfers affect the local spending mix. We
find that a higher degree of redistribution induces the local governments
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to rebalance their expenditure towards a higher share of purely consumptive
spending. As the provision of federal expenditure matching grants constitutes
a way of correcting positive fiscal externalities due to public input provision
(see, e.g., Dahlby, 1996) we also expand our framework in order to analyse
the effects of federal co-financing on the pattern of local public spending.
The implications from our theoretical analysis are finally tested in the
course of an empirical analysis of German state expenditure policies. Ger-
many is a very interesting case to study in this context as tax rates for the
most important tax sources are set coordinately at the federal level and, on
the other hand, states can rather freely decide on the composition of the
expenditure side of their budgets. Also, Germany is characterised by a com-
plex system of intergovernmental grants. The results from our panel analysis
indicate that fiscal equalisation transfers exert an incentive effect on state
expenditure policies as suggested in our theoretical analysis. We find that a
revenue-neutral increase in the marginal contribution rate to the fiscal equal-
isation system induces local jurisdictions to increase the overall budgetary
share of consumptive public goods.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we conduct the theoretical
analysis and derive testable empirical implications. Section 3 then describes
the empirical analysis of state expenditure policy in Germany. Conclusions
are drawn in section 4.
2 Theoretical Analysis
2.1 The Model
The theoretical analysis considers a federation where a numeraire output is
produced in each state using immobile labor L, perfectly mobile capitalK and
a publicly provided input P . The common production technology F (L,K, P )
is assumed to be linear homogenous with respect to labor and capital. The
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public input P is of the factor-augmenting type and raises marginal produc-
tivity of the primary input factors, capital and labor. For analytical conve-
nience labor is normalised to unity and we assume that firms in jurisdiction
i produce according to the following (per labor unit) production technology:
f(ki, Pi) = k
α
i
(
P βi k
−γ
i
)
, 0 < γ < β, α > γ, (α− γ) + β ≤ 1 (1)
The impact of public inputs is modelled by introducing a shift-term,
(
P βi k
−γ
i
)
,
into the production function which captures total factor productivity.3 β cap-
tures the productivity impact of the publicly provided input to private pro-
duction. We allow for crowding effects as the productivity effect P βi of public
input provision is scaled by the factor k−γi , where γ captures the degree of
rivalry in the use of Pi. Only if γ = 0 the public input is completely nonrival-
rous and corresponds to a pure public good. In the other extreme, if γ = β,
the locally provided public input features a private good characteristic. Fur-
thermore, we assume that the production function exhibits non-increasing
returns to scale, i.e. (α− γ) + β ≤ 1.
The states finance themselves by a source-based tax on capital τ¯ , which
is set in coordination with the upper-level government and therefore can
not be altered by the individual jurisdictions. Free capital mobility and
profit maximisation by firms then yields the following marginal productivity
condition for local investment
∂f(ki, Pi)
∂ki
= (α− γ) kα−(1+γ)i P βi = r + τ¯ , (2)
which implies demand for capital ki = φ(r+τ¯ , Pi). Note that congestion is not
treated as an externality in our setting as firms take into account congestion
effects when maximising profits. From the profit maximisation condition we
can derive
∂ki
∂r
=
1
∂2f(ki,Pi)
∂k2i
=
1(
(α− γ)2 − 1
)
k
α−(2+γ)
i P
β
i
< 0
3For an overview on different treatments of public inputs in the literature see Feehan (1989) and ?.
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indicating that a higher net interest rate r reduces demand for capital in
jurisdiction i. Total supply of capital to the federation is given by the positive
funtion s(r) and therefore the capital market equilibrium is given by∑
i
ki =
∑
i
si + s(r), (3)
where si denotes per capita endowment with capital in the jurisdiction.
There is a single household in each state, which derives utility from a
private good ci and a public good Zi. Preferences are quasi-linear according
to the following utility function:
ui = ci + δv(Zi) (4)
Consumers receive total factor income and therefore private consumption in
jurisdiction i is given by
ci = k
α
i
(
P βi k
−γ
i
)
− ki (r + τ¯) + si r.
The state government‘s budget constraint is
bi = Zi + Pi = τ¯ ki + gi,
where gi corresponds to grants from the federal government. As our primary
concern is not so much with the levels of public spending on Zi and Pi but
rather the public expenditure mix, we substitute Pi = λib and Zi = (1−λi)bi
into (4), where λi denotes the overall budgetary share of spending on the
public input Pi.
This leads to the following unconstrained maximisation problem:
max
λ
ui = k
α
i
(
(λibi)
βk−γi
)− ki (r + τ¯) + si r + δv ((1− λi) bi) (5)
The first order condition for the optimal expenditure structure λ∗i can then
be written as
∂ui
∂λi
= kα−γii βP
β−1
i
(
bi + λi
∂bi
∂λi
)
(6)
− δv′
(
bi − (1− λi) ∂bi
∂λi
)
+ (si − ki) ∂r
∂λi
!
= 0,
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where ∂bi∂λi = τ¯
(
∂ki
∂λi
+ ∂ki∂r
∂r
∂λi
)
denotes the positive tax revenue effect due to
an increase in λi.
4 Therefore, in spite of the assumption that τ¯ is exogenous
to the local jurisdiction, which rules out capital tax competition within the
federation, we observe competition for the mobile tax base k via the local
spending decision. Note that, for simplicity, in the following we procede as in
Buettner, Hauptmeier, and Schwager (2006) and assume that in equilibrium
net supply of capital to the state equals zero, i.e. s(r) = 0. Then in all
jurisdictions capital demand ki is supplied by capital endowment si.
Compositional Inefficencies in Local Public Spending Rearranging
(6) shows that the positive tax base effect of an increase in the expendi-
ture structure λi results in a wedge between k
α−γ
i βP
β−1
i , the (net) marginal
product of Pi, and δv
′, the marginal utility of Zi:(
kα−γi βP
β−1
i − δv′
)(
bi + λi
∂bi
∂λi
)
= −δv′ ∂bi
∂λi
(7)
It follows from equation (7) that in the local government optimum kα−γi βP
β−1
i <
δv′. Therefore, although standard tax competition literature suggests that
a coordinated tax policy enables governments to provide public goods ef-
ficiently, i.e. kα−γi βP
β−1
i = δv
′ = 1, we observe a distortion of the local
spending decision due to the productivity effect of public input provision.
This finding is in line with Fuest (1995), who argues that when analysing
fiscal competition one needs to take into account both, taxes and public ex-
penditure. Keen and Marchand (1997) broach the issue of the impact of fiscal
competition on the pattern of public spending and come to the conclusion
that public inputs are relatively overprovided in an uncoordinated equilib-
rium. Their finding can easily be reproduced within our setting as a revenue
4Note that ∂ki∂λi > 0, which means that a higher overall share of spending on public inputs leads to a
higher marginal productivity of capital and therefore to a capital inflow into jurisdiction i. The impact of an
increase in λi on net interest rate r can be derived by implicitly differentiating capital market equilibrium
condition (3). This yields drdλi = −
∂ki
∂λi∑
j
∂kj
∂r − ∂s∂r
> 0. As ∂ki∂r < 0, an increase in λi also has an adverse interest
rate effect on capital demand in jurisdiction i. Nevertheless, as this effect is of second order it follows from
the Envelope Theorem that
(
∂ki
∂λi
+ ∂ki∂r
∂r
∂λi
)
> 0.
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neutral switching from Pi to Zi, i.e. dZi = −dPi, yields the following utility
effect:
dui =
(
kα−γi βP
β−1
i − δv′
)
dPi > 0 (8)
The gap between marginal productivity of Pi and marginal utility of Zi,
which, in equilibrium, arises from the productivity-enhancing characteristic
of the public input, results in a positive welfare effect.
2.2 Introducing Fiscal Equalisation
In the equilibrium described above we observe compositional inefficiencies in
public spending due to externalities which arise from the productivity effect of
public input provision. Recent literature (e.g. Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006)
suggests that efficiency of local public finances can be raised by introducing
a system of fiscal equalisation which corrects for these externalities. There-
fore, in this section we address the question how the implementation of a
redistributive equalization scheme affects a state‘s provision of the tax-base-
enhancing public input relative to its provision of the consumptive public
good.5
As in Buettner, Hauptmeier, and Schwager (2006), we implement fiscal
equalisation by setting a marginal contribution rate ϑi such that income from
grants gi is a linear function of the tax base
gi = yi − ϑki.
With this modification the state’s budget constraint changes to
bi = Zi + Pi = (τ¯ − ϑi) ki + yi,
where yi corresponds to lump-sum grants from the federal government.
5See Dahlby (2002) for a theoretical analysis in the context of the Canadian equalisation system.
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2.2.1 Fiscal Equalisation and the Composition of Public Spending
Now, in order to analyse the effects of fiscal equalisation on the local expen-
diture structure λi we conduct comparative static analysis by applying the
implicit function theorem on f.o.c. (6). Implicit differentiation yields
dλi
dϑi
= −
∂2ui
∂λi∂ϑi
∂2ui
∂λ2i
,
dλi
dyi
= −
∂2ui
∂λi∂yi
∂2ui
∂λ2i
.
As the second order condition for our government optimisation problem, i.e.
∂2ui
∂λ2i
< 0, holds it is obvious that sgn(dλidϑi ) = sgn(
∂2ui
∂λi∂ϑi
) and sgn(dλidyi ) =
sgn( ∂
2ui
∂λi∂ϑi
). Therefore, in the following sections we will focus on the numer-
ators, ∂
2ui
∂λi∂ϑi
and ∂
2ui
∂λi∂yi
, when analysing the impact of variations in the fiscal
equalization parameters ϑi and yi on the expenditure structure λi chosen by
the local jurisdiction.
Income Effect of Fiscal Equalisation The first step is to analyse how an
increase in federal grants affects the state‘s expenditure structure λi. Deriva-
tion of (6) with respect to yi yields
∂2ui
∂λi∂yi
=
(
kα−γi βP
β−1
i − δv′
)
(9)
+ kα−γi β (β − 1)P β−2i
{
λi
(
b+ λi
∂bi
∂λi
)}
− δv′′
{
(1− λi)
(
bi − (1− λi) ∂bi
∂λi
)}
.
The effect of higher federal grants on the marginal utility of λi consists of
three terms. The first term captures the gap between (net) marginal product
of Pi and the marginal benefit of Zi which according to (7) is negative in the
local government optimum. This triggers an incentive to reduce the share
of public inputs when the federal government raises transfers yi. In addition
higher spending on (Pi) lowers its (net) marginal product (term 2) thereby
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further increasing downward pressure on λi. As (1 − λi) of the increase in
federal grants is also spent on (Zi), term 3 indicates that marginal utility
of the public consumption good will also fall leading to an inverse effect on
the marginal utility of λi. Therefore, the overall effect of an increase in yi is
ambiguous.
Incentive Effect of Fiscal Equalisation In order to capture the incentive
effect of fiscal equalisation we calculate the first derivative of f.o.c. (6) with
respect to the marginal contribution rate ϑi
∂2ui
∂λi∂ϑi
=
(
kα−γi βP
β−1
i − δv′
)( ∂bi
∂ϑi
+ λi
∂2bi
∂λi∂ϑi
)
(10)
+ kα−γi β (β − 1)P β−2i
{
λ
∂bi
∂ϑi
(
bi + λi
∂bi
∂λi
)}
+ δv′
∂2bi
∂λi∂ϑi
− δv′′
{
(1− λi) ∂bi
∂ϑi
(
bi + λi
∂bi
∂λi
)}
.
Note that an increase in the marginal contribution rate induces both,
a negative income effect due to higher contributions to the system and a
substitution effect as public input provision becomes relatively more costly.
The second effect arises because the positive tax base effect of public input
provision is redistributed to a greater extent as the marginal contribution rate
ϑi rises. In order to focus on the direct incentive effect of fiscal equalisation
we analytically separate the income effect from the substitution effect by
assuming that jurisdictional income losses are fully compensated by higher
transfers yi from the federal government, i.e. dbi = −ki dϑi + dyi != 0. This
yields the revenue neutral effect of an increase in the marginal contribution
rate:
∂2ui
∂λi∂ϑi
= 4λiki
[
λi
(
δv′ − kα−γi βP β−1i
)
− δv′
]
< 0, (11)
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where 4λiki = ∂ki∂λi + ∂ki∂r ∂r∂λi . Equation (11) shows that a revenue-neutral in-
crease in the marginal contribution rate reduces the jurisdiction‘s optimal
share of public inputs λ∗i . The absolute value of the effect becomes larger
as 4λiki, the positive tax base effect of a higher share of public inputs, in-
creases. This is quite intuitive as fiscal competition becomes fiercer if the
negative spending externality rises. On the other hand, decreasing marginal
productivity of Pi consequently leads to a reduction of the absolute value of
the incentive effect as the share of productive spending and the gap between
(net) marginal productivity of Pi and marginal utility of Zi increase.
Proposition 1 (Incentive Effect of Fiscal Equalisation)
Starting from an interior solution, a revenue-neutral increase in the marginal
contribution rate ϑi to the fiscal equalisation system will induce local jurisdic-
tions to rebalance their budget towards a higher share of purely consumptive
public goods.
Note that, in line with Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), full equalisation, i.e.
τ¯ = ϑi, establishes efficiency of local public finances in our setting as f.o.c.
(6) reduces to
∂ui
∂λi
=
(
kα−γi βP
β−1
i − δv′
)
yi
!
= 0 (12)
Therefore, full equalisation leads to an efficient local public spending mix
as kα−γi βP
β−1 = δv′ = 1.
Corollary 1 (Efficient Equalisation)
First-best optimal local expenditure policies can be decentralised if full equal-
isation is implemented by setting τ¯ = ϑi for all i.
2.3 Introducing Matching Grants
So far we have discussed fiscal competition in the context of a tax base en-
hancing public input whose provision exerts negative fiscal externalities due
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to capital flows within the federation. However, productive public spending
may also generate beneficial external effects.6 As we observe fast diffusion
of knowledge and high mobility of academics, public expenditure on research
and higher education are often cited as examples for public spending cate-
gories inducing interregional spillovers. The positive externalities from pro-
viding these public goods are not internalized by the local decision-maker and
therefore one typically observes relative underprovision. A possibility for cor-
recting such inefficiencies in local public spending is to introduce expenditure
matching grants by the federal government (e.g. Dahlby, 1996). Therefore,
we extend our model by assuming that the federal government covers local
spending on the public input Pi up to the matching rate mi. This changes
the local government‘s budget constraint as follows:
bi =
τ¯ ki + yi
(1−miλi)
In order to analyse the effect of an increase in the matching rate on the local
expenditure structure λi we differentiate f.o.c. (6) with respect to mi. Again,
as in section 2.2.1, we analyse a revenue-neutral variation of the exogenous
parameter as we want to focus on the direct incentive effect. Assuming
dbi = ki dmi − dyi != 0 then yields
∂2ui
∂λi∂mi
=
1 + λi (mi + τ¯4λiki)
(1− λimi)2
[
λi
(
kα−γi βP
β−1
i − δv′
)
+ δv′
]
> 0. (13)
The positive sign of ∂
2ui
∂λi∂mi
is straightforward as a higher matching rate
reduces the cost of local public input provision. Therefore, an exogenous
increase in mi induces the local government to raise its expenditure structure
λi. Because of the decreasing marginal product of Pi the absolute value of
the effect decreases as λi and the gap between (net) marginal productivity of
Pi and marginal utility of Zi increase.
6See Dahlby (1996) for an overview of various tax and expenditure externalities.
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Proposition 2 (Incentive Effect of Matching Grants)
Starting from an interior solution, a revenue-neutral increase in the federal
matching rate mi will induce local jurisdictions to rebalance their budget to-
wards a higher share of public inputs.
3 Empirical Analysis
The above propositions are of particular relevance in the case of the Ger-
man federation. While the German states lack taxing autonomy concerning
their most important tax types (i.e., income and corporate tax, VAT) their
competencies on the expenditure side of the budget are rather unrestricted.
Moreover, state public finances are influenced by a complex system of vertical
and horizontal grants.
Before presenting the underlying data set and the results from our regres-
sion analysis, for a better understanding, we give a brief description of the
German system of intergovernmental grants in section 3.1. Also, we define
”productive” state spending categories in section 3.2.
3.1 Intergovernmental Grants in Germany
Germany is characterised by a pronounced fiscal federalism. Besides the
constitutionally mandated sharing of the main tax revenues (”Gemeinschaft-
steuern”), a variety of intergovernmental grants lead to the fact that public
finances of the different levels of state are strongly interlinked.
The German system of fiscal equalisation (”Bundesstaatlicher Finanzaus-
gleich”) includes both vertical and horizontal transfers. It mainly builds on
two pillars, the state fiscal equalisation system (”La¨nderfinanzausgleich”),
which contains vertical and horizontal elements, and federal grants (”Sonderbedarfs-
Bundeserga¨nzungszuweisungen”) to the states. Within the first pillar states
with a below average fiscal capacity receive horizontal transfers from fis-
cally strong states. Remaining fiscal capacity differences are then further re-
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duced by federal transfers (”Fehlbetrags-Bundeserga¨nzungszuweisungen”).7
Besides these capacity based vertical and horizontal transfers, the federal
government provides grants, which presently mainly flow to the eastern Ger-
man states due to the infrastructural backlog after reunification. All transfers
within the German system of fiscal equalisation are regulated by law (FAG -
”Finanzausgleichsgesetz”).
The federal government also co-finances some constitutionally determined
state spending categories. These so called ”joint tasks” arise from the German
Basic Law (Sec. 91(a) and 91(b)) and include the extension and construction
of universities and university clinics8, the improvement of regional economic
structure as well as the improvement of the agricultural structure and coastal
protection. Beyond financial aid the federal government also contributes via
joint planning in the field of education and by promoting research of supra-
regional importance. Table (1) gives an overview of the most important
intergovernmental grants in the fiscal year 2003.9
3.2 State Productive Spending
Since the emergence of endogenous growth theory in the mid 1980‘s a broad
empirical literature has dealt with the growth effects of fiscal policy (e.g.,
Aschauer, 1989; Barro, 1991). Particularly, the impact of public spending on
long-term economic growth has received substantial attention. While there
is a predominant consensus in the literature that high public spending ratios
and fiscal deficits exert negative growth effects (e.g., Kneller, Bleaney, and
Gemmell, 1999; Bassanini, Scarpetta, and Hemmings, 2001), the empirical
evidence on the growth-enhancing impact of some public spending categories
is heterogenous. Nevertheless, there seems to be ample indication that ”core”
infrastructure spending in the fields of transport and communication (e.g.,
7See Appendix C for a detailed description of the German fiscal equalisation system.
8Note that in the course of a recent reform of German federalism which became effective in September 2006
the joint tasks ”university construction” as well as ”educational planning” have become state competencies.
9Due to data unavailability in 2003 the joint task ”Research promotion” is reported for the year 2002.
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Table 1: : Intergovernmental grants 2003
Grant Mill. e % of GDP
Fiscal equalisation:
State transfers (fiscal capacity based) 6610 0.31
Federal transfers (fiscal capacity based) 2941 0.14
Conditional federal grants 15466 0.71
Joint tasks:
University construction 1060 0.05
Regional economic structure 1158 0.05
Agricultural structure and coastal protection 734 0.03
Educational planning 89 0.004
Research promotion (2002) 3257 0.15
Source: ”Zweite Verordnung zur Durchfu¨hrung des Finanzausgleichsgesetzes 2003”, Central Data Resource
of the State Finance Ministers (ZDL) and own calculations.
Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) induces beneficial productivity effects. More-
over, the empirical evidence on the impact of public activities within the
educational system is rather clear-cut and several publications come to the
conclusion that public spending on education promotes economic growth.10
Concerning expenditure on research and development the question whether
public activities crowd out private investment is discussed quite controversial
in the literature and empirical evidence is far from being clear-cut.11 Though,
as technological progress does not typically constitute a perfectly rival good,
public R&D spending can be justified from an allocative point of view and
should induce, at least minor, positive growth effects.
Thoene (2005) uses the insights from a review of empirical literature on
the growth-effects of different public spending categories and applies them to
the German system of budgetary accounting in order to develop an indicator
10See Buysse (2002) for a panel analysis of OECD countries.
11See Thoene (2005) for an overview of the empirical literature on this issue.
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Table 2: : Aggregate State Spending 2003
Spending category % of Primary spending % of GDP
”Productive” spending categories
Education:
- Schools and pre-school education 15.16 2.33
- Universities 5.95 0.92
- Promotion of pupils students, etc. 1.25 0.19
- Research and Development (outside universities) 0.95 0.15
Infrastructure:
- Streets 3.09 0.48
- Waterways and ports 0.09 0.01
- Rail and public transport 2.81 0.44
- Aviation 0.04 0.01
- Municipal services (sewer system, etc.) 4.28 0.66
Overall ”productive” spending: 33.62 5.19
Reporting:
Primary spending 15.37
Debt spending (% of overall spending and GDP) 7.33 1.22
Source: German statistical office and own calculations.
for the expenditure quality of the German levels of state. Leaving aside
the sustainability aspect in our analysis, we basically follow this approach
when calculating the expenditure structures for the German states. As public
finances of the state and municipal level are strongly interlinked in Germany
we use aggregated expenditure data from the German Statistical Office. Table
(2) gives an overview of the identified ”productive” spending categories for
the aggregated German state level in 2003.
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3.3 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on an annual database for the German states
which covers the period between 1975 and 2003. Since data for the new states
in former East Germany are only available from 1991 onwards our panel is
unbalanced.
The database contains detailed information on the composition of state
spending which we used to compute expenditure structures as described in
section 3.2. Table 3 presents overall ”productive” spending as well as spend-
ing on universities as a share of primary expenditure. Both variables show
substantial variation within the German federation. The matching rate cor-
responds to the rate at which the federal government co-finances state spend-
ing in the field of university construction (See section 3.1). In addition, the
database contains information about the treatment of each state in the fiscal
equalisation system. More specifically, the database allows us to compute
for each state and each year all contributions and transfers related to fiscal
equalisation at the state level (see Appendix C). Equalisation transfers vary
strongly between positive and negative figures indicating that some states
receive positive transfers while others are net contributors. Note that the
marginal contribution rate is above 70 % at the mean, indicating that on av-
erage a state has to transfer an amount of more than 70 cents out of each Euro
of additional tax revenue.12 We have also calculated standardized marginal
contribution rates and fiscal equalisation transfers in order to account for a
problem of endogeneity.13 The data set also contains detailed information on
federal grants to the German states.
Some further control variables are used to capture the relative fiscal strength
of a state, fiscal stress (i.e. debt service and unemployment), the population
size as well as the partisan composition of state governments. The latter will
12The negative minimum value constitutes an outlier resulting from the special case of the city state of
Hamburg in 2002. Also, values above 100 % are rarely observed.
13Standardized marginal contribution rates and fiscal equalisation transfers are computed on the basis of
average tax bases. See 3.4 for further details.
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control for political preferences.
3.4 Estimation approach and results
The basic estimation equation we use to identify the determinants of state
expenditure policies in Germany looks as follows:
λi,t = α + β1λi,t−1 + β2ϑi,t + β3mi,t + β4feqtransi,t (14)
+ β5fgrantsi,t +
∑
j
γjxi,t,j + χi + ψt + εi,t
On the left-hand side we have productive spending as a share of primary
spending, λ.14 As we assume the decision on the expenditure structure to
constitute a dynamic process, we take into account the lagged dependent vari-
able on the right-hand side of our estimation equation. The central variables
capturing the incentive effects of the system of intergovernmental grants in
Germany are ϑ, the marginal contribution rate, and m, the rate at which
spending is co-financed by the federal government. feqtrans and fgrants
control for income effects due to fiscal equalisation transfers and federal grants
and we implement a set of control variables xi already described in section
3.3. Fixed effects χi are included to control for state heterogeneity and we
implement a full set of time dummies ψt.
Table (4) provides results using overall productive spending (% of primary
spending) as defined in Table (2) as the dependent variable. Specifications
(1) uses the basic set of explanatory variables and specifications (2) and (3),
following Buettner (2006), test for the impact of non-linear differences in fiscal
capacity. We apply a standard Least Squares Dummy Variable Estimator
(LSDV) in specifications (1) - (3) and estimate an unbalanced panel only
including the former eastern German states from the year 1991 onwards. In
order to control for differential developments in the years after reunification,
14See section (3.2).
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we include an eastern state dummy which we interact with the time dummies
between 1991 and 1995.
The strong effect of the lagged expenditure structure supports a standard
partial adjustment process. With regard to the incentives generated by the
state fiscal equalisation system note that the specifications test for the effects
conditional on (relative) fiscal capacity. This is important to make sure that
the results capture the impact of the fiscal equalisation system rather than
simply reflecting differences in fiscal strength. In order to make sure that also
no non-linear differences in the fiscal capacity are driving the results, speci-
fications (2) and (3) employ quadratic and cubic specifications, respectively.
Note that due to the fact that the treatment within the system of fiscal equal-
isation is not exogenous to the states, there arises a problem of endogeneity
concerning the fiscal equalization variables. As state governments can influ-
ence their position within the system via their economic policy the states’
expenditure structures and fiscal equalization variables are determined simul-
taneously. Therefore, in order to overcome this problem of reverse causality,
we compute standardized levels of fiscal equalisation transfers and marginal
contribution rates using a simulation programme of the German fiscal equal-
isation system. For each state, the parameters are computed at average (per
capita) levels of the tax revenues from the main tax sources, i.e. income
and corporate taxes as well as the local business tax, thereby only captur-
ing variation from population developments and presumably exogenous tax
sources.15
The results in Table 4 support the direct incentive effect of the fiscal equal-
isation system as stated in Proposition 1. Controlling for income effects by
taking into account the transfers received from or contributed to the sys-
tem we find a significant negative impact of the marginal contribution rate
in specifications (2) and (3). The point estimate in specification (3) implies
that an increase in the marginal contribution rate by one percentage point
15See Appendix B for further details on the computation of the fiscal equalisation parameters.
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Table 4: : Determinants of States’ Expenditure Structures (Productive
Spending)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
LSDV LSDV LSDV GMM
Expenditure structure, lag .6335 ?? .6170 ?? .6117 ?? .6443 ??
(.0539) (.0555) (.0542) (.0459)
Marginal contribution rate -.0050 -.0058 ? -.0062 ? -.0066 ??
(.0033) (.0033) (.0033) (.0032)
Fiscal equalisation transfers -.0017 ?? -.0018 ?? -.0019 ?? -.0022 ??
(.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0006)
Federal grants .0004 .0005 .0004 .0008 ??
(.0005) (.0006) (.0005) (.0003)
Social democratic government .6895 ?? .6651 ?? .5921 ?? .7032 ??
(.2271) (.2269) (.2194) (.2738)
Social democratic coalition government .5716 ?? .5076 ?? .4086 ? .6558 ??
(.2393) (.2397) (.2321) (.2289)
Unemployment rate -.0300 -.0080 -.0086 -.0803 ??
(.0563) (.0553) (.0553) (.0256)
Population, log 2.263 3.011 3.982 6.209 ??
(3.813) (3.810) (3.667) (1.908)
Relative fiscal capacity -.0466 ?? .1697 -2.477 ?? -.0468 ?
(.0184) (.1731) (1.233) (.0270)
Relative fiscal capacity (quadratic) -.0011 .0263 ??
(.0008) (.0124)
Relative fiscal capacity (cubic) -.0001 ??
(.0000)
R-squared (adjusted) .9343 .9346 .9360
Arellano Bond test AR (1) z = -2.36
Arellano Bond test AR (2) z = 0.22
All specifications include state-specific and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. If
significant at 5% (10%) level coefficients are marked with two stars (one star). Insignificant control variables
are not reported and include debt service, political variables as well as an interaction dummy capturing
differential developments in the eastern states after reunification.
leads to a decrease in the share of productive spending by 0.0062 percent-
age points. Taking into account that the difference between the highest and
lowest marginal contribution rate in 2003 amounted to around 50 percent-
age points the short run incentive effect of fiscal equalisation may sum up to
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a 0.33 percentage point lower share of productive expenditure. In the long
run, taking into account the coefficient of the lagged productive expenditure
structure, we observe an effect of up to 0.85 percentage points.
We also observe a highly significant and negative coefficient on the fiscal
equalisation transfers, which could capture the effect that states who strongly
depend on fiscal capacity based intergovernmental transfers have a lesser
incentive to improve their quality of public finances as higher tax revenues
will diminish transfers. On the other hand federal grants, which are not
formula based, coincide with a higher share of ”productive” spending, though
this effect is not significant in specifications (1) - (3).
It is well known that inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in fixed
effects models leads to biased estimates if the time dimension T of the panel is
small. According to Nickel (1981) this bias approaches zero as T approaches
infinity. As the average time dimension of our data set amounts to 21 years
we do not expect severely biased estimates when using the LSDV estimator.
Nevertheless, in addition we perform a one-step Arellano and Bond GMM es-
timation in specification (4) in order to account for this so-called Nickel bias.16
The results confirm that the bias due to inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable stays within limits. The coefficients on the marginal contribution
rate ϑ as well as the fiscal equalisation transfers decrease only marginally
when using GMM estimation techniques. In contrast, the federal grants now
turn significant at the 5% level and the corresponding coefficient doubles
compared to specification (3).
Also, we find that the partisan composition of the state government con-
stitutes an important determinant of the expenditure structure. Again, this
result does not change qualitatively when performing GMM estimation. Us-
ing the case of a conservative government as reference, we observe a signif-
icantly higher share of productive spending when the state government is
social democratic or a social democratically led. It is also worthwhile notic-
16See Arellano and Bond (1991) for further details on this estimation technique.
20
ing that the control variables capturing fiscal stress, i.e. debt service and
unemployment rate, show the expected negative sign but do not turn out to
be significant in specifications (1) - (3). While debt service stays insignifi-
cant in specification (4) the unemployment rate becomes highly significant
when using the GMM estimator. A higher unemployment rate therefore has
a negative impact on the overall share of ”productive” state spending. More-
over, we observe a significant positive impact of the population number when
performing GMM.
In order to test Proposition 2, i.e. the impact of matching grants on state
expenditure structures, we carry out further regressions focussing on state
university spending. The reason for narrowing state productive spending to
the university category is the fact that data on federal co-financing rates
within the ”joint-tasks” described in section 3.1, to our knowledge, is only
available for the field of ”university construction”. Table 5 provides results
using university spending as a share of primary spending as the dependent
variable. We use the same specifications as described in Table 4. The results
do not clearly support the incentive effect stated in Proposition 2. Although,
as suggested by theory, the coefficient on the federal matching rate displays
a positive sign the effect is only significant in specification (1).
Note that the inclusion of the federal matching rate does not qualitatively
change the results from our earlier regression reported in Table 4. The fis-
cal equalisation variables show robust when accounting for the impact of
matching grants, although the negative effect of the marginal contribution
rate decreases in absolute value while the effect of fiscal equalisation transfers
increases. However, the change in absolute values might also result from the
fact that we are focussing on university spending now. It is also interesting
that we observe different results concerning the political variables. Again,
taking the case of a conservative government as reference, we now find sig-
nificant positive coefficients on the dummy variables capturing the impact
of coalition governments. The effect is independent of the fact who is lead-
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Table 5: : Determinants of States’ Expenditure Structures (University Spend-
ing)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
LSDV LSDV LSDV GMM
Expenditure structure, lag .5330 ?? .5314 ?? .5379 ?? .5186 ??
(.0849) (.0856) (.0831) (.0849)
Matching rate .0080 ? .0078 .0072 .0049
(.0050) (.0051) (.0072) (.0038)
Marginal contribution rate -.0035 ? -.0038 ? -.0039 ? -.0043 ??
(.0020) (.0021) (.0021) (.0015)
Fiscal equalisation transfers -.0029 ?? -.0029 ?? .0021 ?? -.0025 ??
(.0007) (.0007) (.0006) (.0003)
Federal grants -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0003
(.0004) (.0003) (.0003) (.0002)
Social democratic coalition government .3329 ? .3066 ? .2688 .3297
(.1807) (.1837) (.1810) (.2059)
Conservative coalition government .3125 ?? .3156 ?? .3205 ?? .3271 ?
(.1473) (.1471) (.1472) (.1897)
Unemployment rate -.0385 -.0309 -.0310 -.0894 ??
(.0449) (.0448) (.0449) (.0441)
Relative fiscal capacity -.0661 ?? .0043 -.9403 -.0499 ??
(.0172) (.1035) (.6484) (.0090)
Relative fiscal capacity (quadratic) .1034 .0094
(.0005) (.0065)
Relative fiscal capacity (cubic) -.0000
(.0000)
R-squared (adjusted) .9766 .9765 .9766
Arellano Bond test AR (1) z = -2.54
Arellano Bond test AR (2) z = 0.58
All specifications include state-specific and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. If
significant at 5% (10%) level coefficients are marked with two stars (one star). Insignificant control variables
are not reported and include debt service, political variables as well as an interaction dummy capturing
differential developments in the eastern states after reunification.
ing the government and equally strong for both, social democratically and
conservative coalition governments.
Taken together, we can state that the empirical analysis provides partial
confirmation of the above stated theoretical predictions. First, the existence
22
of a direct incentive effect of fiscal equalisation is supported. We find that
state governments who are facing high marginal contribution rates within the
German fiscal equalisation system tend to be characterised by lower shares
of ”productive spending”. Our hypothesis that federal co-financing should
stimulate spending and therefore, in our setting, lead to a higher share of
”productive” spending as formulated in Proposition 2 could not be confirmed
on the basis of our data. Though we observe the expected sign the effect of
the federal matching rate m is not statistically significant. The fact that, due
to data unavailability, we had to focus on university spending might well be
a reason for this result.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we use a simple model of fiscal competition where local juris-
diction compete for a mobile tax base via the provision of a productivity-
enhancing public input. In line with the finding from Keen and Marchand
(1997), we show that without coordination the local public expenditure struc-
ture is biased, i.e. productivity-enhancing public inputs are relatively over-
provided compared to purely consumptive public goods. Similar to the case
of tax competition for mobile tax bases (see, e.g., Bucovetsky and Smart,
2006), the implementation of a redistributive grant system can increase or,
in the case of full equalisation, even restore efficiency of local public finances.
We find that a revenue-neutral increase in the marginal contribution rate to
the fiscal equalisation system induces local jurisdictions to increase the over-
all budgetary share of consumptive public goods. Finally, as the provision
of expenditure matching grants constitutes an instrument for correcting pos-
itive externalities induced by local public input provision (see, e.g., Dahlby,
1996) we expand our model and derive the intuitive result that a higher fed-
eral co-financing rate encourages local jurisdictions to rebalance their budgets
towards a higher share of public inputs.
23
Our empirical analysis of state expenditure policies in Germany partially
support the theoretical implications. We find that higher marginal contri-
bution rates to the state fiscal equalisation system induce state governments
to put stronger weight on public consumptive spending. Although observing
the expected sign, we cannot confirm a significantly positive impact of federal
co-financing on the basis of our data set.
Our results support the existence of incentive effects of fiscal equalisation
on local expenditure policies. Whether redistributive systems of fiscal equal-
isation in practise actually enhance efficiency of public finances and thereby,
as suggested by a number of theoretical contributions, increase welfare, states
a difficult and interesting question. Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006), for
example, put forward that equalisation programs can lead to perverse fiscal
incentives if political accountability is reduced. Therefore, taking into ac-
count political incentives and possible inefficiencies of the public sector when
analysing fiscal institutions in a fiscal competition context deserves further
attention.
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Appendix A: Data Sources and Definitions
The basic dataset consists of annual data for Germany in the period 1975
until 2003. Data for the former East German states are only available from
1991 onwards.
The detailed expenditure data, population data and data on state
specific unemployment rates are obtained from the German federal statis-
tical office (Statistisches Bundesamt). Federal matching rates (university
construction) are taken from the ”34. Rahmenplan fu¨r den Hochschulbau
nach dem Hochschulbaufo¨rderungsgesetz 2005-2008”. Fiscal equalisation
transfers, marginal contribution rates and relative fiscal capacity
are obtained from a full implementation of the fiscal equalization law and
further relevant statutory definitions for each year in the period 1975-2003
(a description of the system is given in Appendix C). Federal fiscal equal-
ization rules (Finanzausgleichsgesetz - FAG) are obtained from the Bundes-
gesetzblatt. Data for calculating fiscal capacity (Finanzkraftmesszahl) and
fiscal need (Ausgleichsmesszahl) are taken from the annual enactments to
implement the fiscal equalization law (Zweite Verordnung zur Durchfu¨hrung
des Gesetzes u¨ber den Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und La¨ndern in den
Ausgleichsjahren 1975 - 2003). These enactments are also obtained from
the Bundesgesetzblatt. Data on federal grants (”Sonderbedarfs-Bundes-
erga¨nzungszuweisungen”) are taken from the FAG. Relative fiscal capac-
ity is defined as the ratio of fiscal capacity to fiscal need. The information
on the partisan composition of state governments are obtained from
http://www.election.de/.
Appendix B: State-Level Fiscal Equalization in
Germany
In order to capture the incentive effects of the state-level fiscal equalization
system (SFES) in Germany, we employ a simulation program to calculate
transfers received as well as marginal contribution rates. The full implemen-
tation of the fiscal equalization rules into the simulation programme enables
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us to compute various parameters of the SFES. The calculations are based
on population and tax data for the German states (“Bundesla¨nder”). The
following briefly describes the system in the state of the year 2004.17
The treatment of a state within the system depends on the ratio of its fiscal
capacity (“Finanzkraftmesszahl”) and its fiscal needs (“Ausgleichsmesszahl”).
We will refer to this ratio as the relative fiscal capacity. A state’s fiscal ca-
pacity ti is determined by the sum of its tax revenues from different types of
taxes.18 Fiscal needs ni are calculated by multiplying the average per capita
tax revenues in the federation by the state’s population. Formally
ni =
∑
j tj
P
pi,
where P represents the overall population while pi denotes the population in
state i. States with fiscal capacity below fiscal needs receive transfers, while
states with a fiscal capacity exceeding fiscal need contribute to the system.
The German SFES contains three different stages:
• VAT Equalization (“Umsatzsteuervorwegausgleich”)
• State Fiscal Equalization (“Finanzausgleich i.e.S.”)
• Federal Grants (“Bundeserga¨nzungszuweisungen”)
VAT Equalization In the first stage of the SFES up to 25% of the overall
VAT revenues are used to compensate fiscal capacity differences between
the German states. States with a relative fiscal capacity below one receive
transfers
zi1 = γ1(
ti1
ni1
)ni1 ,
where the transfer rate in stage one of the SFES, γ1, represents a function of
the state‘s relative fiscal capacity.19 To see how a marginal increase in the
17Note that in 2005 a reform of the SFES became effective. However, the basic structure and mechanisms
have not been changed.
18In the SFES the following main types of taxes are taken into account: income tax, corporate income
tax, VAT and excise and sales taxes, and a fraction of the municipal taxes.
19Note that in the VAT Equalization stage only the state revenues are taken into account. In stage two and
three fiscal capacity will also include a fraction of the municipal tax revenues as well as the VAT revenues.
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tax revenues in state i affects the transfers received in stage one, note that
∂zi1
∂ti1
= γ′1
[
ni1 − piP ti1
ni1
]
+ γ1
pi
P
= γ′1
[
1− ti1∑
j tj1
]
+ γ1
pi
P
< 0.
The first term captures the effect of a decreasing transfer rate on zi1. As
γ′1 < 0, since an increase in fiscal capacity lowers the transfer rate, this term
is negative. Taking into account that an increase in the fiscal capacity of state
i will also have a positive impact on its fiscal need, the second summand is
positive. The overall effect for a low capacity state, i.e. a state which is
characterized by a relative fiscal capacity below one, is negative indicating
that an increase in tax revenues will reduce the amount of transfers the state
receives within the SFES.
On the other hand, also high fiscal capacity states will be affected by stage
one. A marginal increase in the tax revenues will not only raise fiscal capacity
in this state but will also raise fiscal need in state i as well as in all other
states. Low capacity states will then receive additional transfers within VAT
Equalization, which are financed out of the overall VAT revenue. Therefore
the high capacity state i will have to contribute the additional amount
∂ci1
∂ti1
> 0
to the SFES. Here ci1 denotes the contribution rate for a high capacity state
within VAT Equalization.
Fiscal Equalization In the second stage of the SFES fiscal capacity differ-
ences which remain after VAT Equalization are further reduced. As in stage
one, low capacity states receive transfers
zi2 = γ2(
ti2
ni2
)ni2
depending on their relative fiscal capacity. The only difference is that now
also VAT revenues as well as revenues from municipal taxes are taken into
account for calculating ti2 and ni2. The effect of an increase in fiscal capacity
∂zi2
∂ti2
is equivalent to stage one.
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In the Fiscal Equalization stage high fiscal capacity states, i.e. states
which are characterized by a relative fiscal capacity above one, contribute
the amount
ci2 = δ2(
ti2
ni2
)ni2.
The contribution rate δ2 represents a function of the relative fiscal capacity
in state i. Then the marginal effect of an increase in the fiscal capacity in
state i reads
∂ci2
∂ti2
=
[
1− ti2∑
j tj2
]
δ′2 + δ2
pi
P
> 0.
Note that the δ′2 > 0 indicating that an increase in fiscal capacity will lead to a
higher contribution rate. Again we can distinguish two different effects. The
effect due to an increased contribution rate as well as an effect which arises
from the fact, that an increase in the fiscal capacity in state i will increase
fiscal need in all states. Both effects are positive leading to an overall increase
in state i‘s contributions to the SFES.
Federal grants If a state‘s relative fiscal capacity lies below 0.995 after
the stages one and two it will in addition receive transfers from the federal
level, formally
zi3 = 0.775 [0.995ni3 − ti3] = 0.771ni3 − 0.775ti3.
Differentiating with respect to fiscal capacity in state i yields
∂zi3
∂ti3
= 0.771
pi
P
− 0.775 < 0.
As this partial derivative is negative an increase in the fiscal capacity of a low
capacity state i will lead to a decrease in grants from the federal government.
Marginal Contribution Rates for the SFES The marginal contribution
rates for the different stages of the SFES were calculated as follows.
For low capacity states
ϑi1 = |∂zi1
∂ti1
|, ϑi2 = |∂zi2
∂ti2
|, ϑi3 = |∂zi3
∂ti3
|.
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For high capacity states
ϑi1 =
∂ci1
∂ti1
, ϑi2 =
∂ci2
∂ti2
.
By adding the marginal contribution rates from the different SFES stages
one receives the overall marginal effect of an increase in a state’s tax revenues.
For practical reasons the simulations assume a tax increase by one percent.
Then, for example, the mean marginal contribution rate of 70% indicates
that only 30 cent of the additional taxes remain in the state budget due to
increased contributions or reduced transfers within the SFES.
29
References
Arellano, M., and S. Bond (1991): “Some tests of specification for panel
data,” Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277–297.
Aschauer, D. (1989): “Is Public Expenditure Productive?,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 23(2), 177–200.
Barro, R. (1991): “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2), 407–443.
Bassanini, A., S. Scarpetta, and P. Hemmings (2001): “Economic
Growth: The Role of Policies and Institutions. Panel Data Evidence from
OECD Countries,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers 283,
Paris.
Bucovetsky, S., and M. Smart (2006): “The Efficiency Consequences of
Local Revenue Equalization: Tax competition and tax distortions,” Jour-
nal of Public Economic Theory, 8(1), 199–144.
Buettner, T. (2006): “The Incentive Effect of Fiscal Equalization Trans-
fers on Tax Policy,” Journal of Public Economics, 90, 477–497.
Buettner, T., S. Hauptmeier, and R. Schwager (2006): “Efficient
Revenue Sharing and Upper Level Governments: Theory and Application
to Germany,” CESifo Working Paper 1656, Munich.
Buysse, K. (2002): “Human Capital and Growth in OECD Countries: The
Role of Public Expenditure on Education,” in: The Impact of Fiscal Policy,
Banca d’Italia, Research Department, Public Finance Workshop, Perugia.
Dahlby, B. (1996): “Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental
grants,” International Tax and Public Finance, 3(3), 397–412.
(2002): “The incentive effects of fiscal equalization grants,” confer-
ence paper, Montreal.
30
Easterly, W., and S. Rebelo (1993): “Fiscal Policy and Economic
Growth: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
32(3), 417–458.
Feehan, J. (1989): “Pareto-Efficiency with Three Varieties of Public Input,”
Public Finance, 44(2), 237–248.
Fuest, C. (1995): “Interjurisdictional Competition and Public Expenditure:
Is Tax Co-ordination Counterproductive?,” Finanzarchiv, 52, 478–496.
Keen, M., andM. Marchand (1997): “Fiscal Competition and the pattern
of public spending,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 33–53.
Kneller, R., M. Bleaney, and N. Gemmell (1999): “Fiscal policy and
growth: evidence from OECD countries,” Journal of Public Economics,
74(2), 171–190.
Koethenbuerger, M. (2002): “Tax competition and fiscal equalization,”
International Tax and Public Finance, 9, 391–408.
Kotsogiannis, C., and R. Schwager (2006): “Fiscal equalization and
yardstick competition,” CESifo Working Paper 1865, Munich.
Nickel, S. (1981): “Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects,” Econo-
metrica, 49(6), 1417–1426.
Thoene, M. (2005): “Wachstums- und nachhaltigkeitswirksame o¨ffentliche
Ausgaben (”WNA”),” FiFo-Berichte Nr. 2, Koeln.
Zodrow, G., and P. Mieszkowski (1986): “Pigou, Tiebout, property
taxation and the underprovision of local public goods,” Journal of Urban
Economics, 19, 356–370.
31
